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Abstract
The domain of urban freight logistics is becoming increasingly complex. Many urban supply
chains are composed of small and independent actors; for such actors it is particularly difficult
to efficiently organize the highly fragmented supply chains that they must deal with. As a
consequence, a high number of transport movements is required to satisfy the high service level
demands of receivers, which has negative effects on the environment as well as on the quality of
life in urban areas. Both companies and local administrators try to improve transport efficiency
and reduce external costs, but the effects of such interventions are difficult to predict, especially
when applied in combination with each other (an urban logistics scheme). This paper proposes
an agent-based simulation framework that quantifies the effects of urban logistics schemes
on multiple actors. We provide a detailed mathematical representation of the framework.
The working of the framework is demonstrated with numerical experiments that evaluate a
variety of urban logistics schemes. We show that most schemes yield significant environmental
improvements; achieving financial sustainability, however, is challenging. Also, interventions
such as subsidies and access restrictions do not always have the intended effect. Our experiments
underline the applicability of the framework to quantify the effects of urban logistics schemes.
1 Introduction
Throughout the world, ongoing urbanization results in an ever increasing consumption of goods
in urban areas, resulting in large flows of goods towards cities (MDS Transmodal Limited 2012).
Due to competition with e-commerce, the roles of retailers have changed over time. Many
retailers have adopted Just-in-Time ordering principles to cut their on-site inventories, thus
requiring more frequent and accurately timed deliveries. Another development is the resurrected
interest in small, specialized shops, seemingly reversing the trend of ever-expanding chains of
mega-stores. The resulting fragmentation of freight flows makes it challenging for carriers to
efficiently conduct their transport (Dablanc 2011).
Inefficiently organized freight flows have hazardous environmental and societal effects, e.g.,
more traffic jams, higher emissions, more noise pollution, and reduced traffic safety (Ploos
Van Amstel 2015). Both governments and companies try to find solutions in an effort to reduce
the negative impacts of urban freight logistics. For example, local administrators may impose
access restrictions on heavy trucks or set zone access fees. Companies may adopt new methods
and resources to improve the efficiency of their operations. Smaller companies are often limited
by the scale of their operations; often collaboration is necessary to significantly reduce costs.
The solutions of companies and governments may affect each other, e.g., a minimum load factor
imposed by the local administrator may instigate carriers towards horizontal collaboration
efforts. It is therefore imperative that interventions are analyzed in conjunction with each
other. In the context of this paper, we define an urban logistics scheme as a set of company-
driven initiatives and administrative policies, with the aim to improve efficiency and/or reduce
environmental and societal costs. The focus of this paper is on small actors (e.g., shippers,
carriers, receivers); such actors are often unable to efficiently organize their logistics activities
internally due to a lack of volume, and need to cooperate to achieve economies of scale.
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Despite the eminent need for a better organization of urban logistics, the vast majority
of schemes implemented in practice fails after a short life-span (Browne et al. 2005). A major
reason for this inefficiency is that the involved actors typically have divergent objectives (Bektas¸,
Crainic, and Van Woensel 2015). Furthermore, administrators often provide subsidies to support
initiatives, but actors typically revert back to their former decisions once subsidies are halted
(Ploos Van Amstel 2015). A last shortcoming is that analysis before implementation often
focuses solely on the processes within the city boundaries, ignoring the considerable impact of
upstream decisions. The framework presented in this paper explicitly addresses these aspects.
A key success factor for urban logistics schemes is the right combination of company involvement
and governmental policies (Browne et al. 2005). Actors must be willing to permanently change
their behavior, without requiring perpetual external cash flows. Traditional optimization techniques
may be used to find viable system-wide solutions, yet these are not guaranteed to be stable when
their success depends on multiple decision makers. Agent-based simulation (ABS) is suitable to
evaluate such schemes, as it is capable of monitoring and altering the behavior of autonomous
actors under conditions that may be flexibly adjusted (Taniguchi, Thompson, and Yamada
2014). We present an ABS framework to evaluate the effectiveness of urban logistics schemes
that include both governmental policies and company-driven initiatives.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we contrast our work
to both other agent-based studies and alternative quantitative solution methods. Section 3
describes our ABS framework. Section 4 presents numerical experiments that both demonstrate
the framework and provide insights into urban logistics schemes. We end with the main
conclusions in Section 5.
2 Literature on evaluating urban logistics initiatives
As mentioned in Section 1, both companies and administrators actively intervene in urban
freight flows to improve the cost efficiency and environmental impact of urban freight logistics.
Quak (2011) distinguishes four classes of initiatives in urban logistics: (i) physical infrastructure
initiatives (e.g., consolidation centers, special lanes for electric vehicles), (ii) transport-reorganizing
initiatives (e.g., using alternative transport modes), (iii) governmental policies (e.g., vehicle
access restrictions, zone access fees, subsidization), and (iv) company-driven initiatives (e.g.,
improved routing algorithms, better use of real-time data, collaboration structures). To quantify
the impact of such initiatives, a variety of operations research methods might be applied. For
literature reviews on modeling efforts in urban logistics, we refer to Anand et al. (2012) and
Bektas¸, Crainic, and Van Woensel (2015). Relatively few papers in the context of urban logistics
adopt an operations research perspective (Crainic, Ricciardi, and Storchi 2009). This section
gives a non-exhaustive overview.
The Vehicle Routing Problem (VRP) is at the base of many transport problems studied in
literature. Also in the context of urban logistics, a number of VRP variants exist. Cattaruzza
et al. (2015) and Kim et al. (2015) provide overviews of VRP solution methods in urban logistics;
we highlight a few applications in various problem classes. A first variant of applications embeds
time-dependent travel times, since urban areas are often subject to congestion during peak hours.
Examples of works on this variant are Van Woensel et al. (2008) and Kok et al. (2010). A second
class is the VRP with access time constraints that allow trucks to drive within the city only
within designated time intervals, see Mun˜uzuri et al. (2012) for an example. The final variant
that we mention is the emission routing problem, which aims to minimize emissions within
certain constraints (Bektas¸, Demir, and Laporte 2016). Recent works on this topic are Suzuki
(2011), Ehmke, Campbell, and Thomas (2016), and Cheng et al. (2016).
Urban consolidation centers (UCCs) enable the decoupling and bundling of inbound freight
flows. They have an important role in many urban logistics schemes. Many cities have at most
a single UCC, yet systems with more facilities – and sometimes multiple layers of facilities –
exist as well. The multi-echelon distribution system is a general description for such structures;
Cuda, Guastaroba, and Speranza (2015) provide a literature review on planning methods in such
distribution systems. Some notable works on logistics planning in (multi-)echelon distribution
systems are Crainic, Ricciardi, and Storchi (2009), Hemmelmayr, Cordeau, and Crainic (2012),
Baldacci et al. (2013), and Dellaert et al. (2016).
The solution methods mentioned so far are designed from the perspective of isolated decision
makers (typically carriers); as such they are not able to capture system-wide effects and autonomous
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decision-making by multiple actors. To address this issue, Macharis (2007) describes the use of
multi-criteria, multi-actor evaluation in the field of logistics. This method defines an objective
function for every actor involved – often comprising both financial and non-financial components
– and computes the impact of schemes for each actor involved. Exemplary applications of such
evaluations may be found in Macharis, Turcksin, and Lebeau (2012), Stathopoulos, Valeri, and
Marcucci (2012), and Verlinde et al. (2014). Although multi-actor evaluation considers the
system-wide impact of schemes and illuminates discrepancies, it does not specify the decision
policies of the involved actors and possible interactions between them. Therefore, it does not
allow to analyze evolutionary systems in which actors can adjust their behavior based on a
changing state of the system.
A solution method that does take into account the strategic interactions between various
actors is game theory. In particular, cooperative game theory is relevant to study collaboration
initiatives in urban logistics. Examples of game-theoretical applications in logistics are Reyes
(2005), Yang and Odani (2007), Dahlberg (2015), and Hafezalkotob and Makui (2015). Although
game theory provides a framework to model and evaluate the interaction between multiple
actors, it also has several drawbacks. Most pronounced is the large computational effort required
to solve instances with many actors. Furthermore, considerable efforts may be required to model
each scheme.
Taniguchi, Thompson, and Yamada (2014) and Anand, Van Duin, and Tavasszy (2016)
state that ABS is the most applicable method to study the behavior of and interaction between
the various actors in urban logistics. We mention some notable ABS studies in the field of
urban logistics. Taniguchi, Yamada, and Okamoto (2007) present an agent-based model in
which carriers use a routing algorithm that dynamically adjusts to the prevailing travel times.
By adopting this more advanced routing algorithm, both carriers and shippers are able to
benefit from the resulting cost reductions, while emissions are also reduced. A prerequisite
for success is that a gain-sharing mechanism is installed, such that both carriers and shippers
profit from the efficiency gains. Tamagawa, Taniguchi, and Yamada (2010) perform an ABS
study in which they heuristically solve a VRP and iteratively update the actions of five agent
types by means of learning mechanisms. The numerical experiments revolve around the effects
of road pricing and truck bans. Van Duin et al. (2012) investigate the financial model and
the environmental impact of UCCs, taking into account UCC service fees, road pricing, and
subsidizing. Based on numerical experiments, they conclude that for a UCC to be financially
viable, additional revenues from permanent subsidies or value-adding services are required.
Wangapisit et al. (2014) evaluate the use of consolidation centers by imposing parking constraints
and providing subsidies to carriers. They state that these interventions significantly contribute
to the reduction of emissions. Teo, Taniguchi, and Qureshi (2014) study the effects of road
pricing and a load factor control system, using customer complaints on late deliveries as a
driver to alter the selection of carriers. The authors claim that the studied interventions have
a positive environmental effect. A recent line of research – see, e.g., Anand, Van Duin, and
Tavasszy (2016) and Marcucci et al. (2017)) – emphasizes the importance of validating the
agent descriptions with real-life counterparts, possibly even directly deriving utility functions
from their input. We are unaware of any realistic-sized models of this type; although real-life
validation improves the credibility of the model, it is also highly time-consuming.
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, in contrast to the ABS studies mentioned
in this literature overview, we take into account the transport process outside the city, better
reflecting decisions made by shippers and carriers. Second, we explicitly include various forms
of cooperation between companies, while existing studies tend to have a strong focus on testing
governmental policies. As practice shows that successful schemes require both administrative
policies and company-driven initiatives, a framework that explicitly includes both aspects is
essential for proper evaluation of these schemes. Van Heeswijk, Mes, and Schutten (2016) sketch
a preliminary version of this framework. In this paper, we present a rigorous mathematical
formulation of the model that allows others to also implement our framework. Furthermore, we
perform a numerical study with the framework and provide key insights for the tested urban
logistics schemes.
3
3 Framework design
In this section, we outline the design of our ABS framework. The mathematical formulation
of the framework provides concrete guidelines for its implementation. To not overly complicate
the mathematical presentation, we introduce the following simplifications, which may easily be
omitted in actual implementations of the framework: all routes are completed within a single
time interval, pickup routes outside the city are not specifically described, and the network
contains a single UCC location in a single city.
Figure 1 shows a high-level overview of the framework. Decisions are divided into three
levels: strategic (long-term), tactical (medium-term), and operational (short-term). Strategic
decisions about, e.g., administrative policies are fixed for the complete simulation run, which
typically represents multiple years. At the tactical level (e.g., decisions updated every month),
costs, prices and subsidies are updated; subsequently, decisions such as outsourcing to the UCC
are made. At the operational level (e.g., daily), orders are placed and agents make decisions like
dispatching and routing. The supply chain is structured as follows: (i) receivers communicate
their order placements to the shippers, (ii) shippers dispatch a subset of the orders requested
by receivers, (iii) carriers transport the orders that are dispatched by shippers, (iv) the UCC
receives a subset of the orders transported by the carriers, and (v) the UCC dispatches a subset
of orders in inventory for delivery.
The outline of the remainder of this section is as follows. We describe the roles of the agent
types in Section 3.1. In Section 3.2, we formally define the state of the system. Section 3.3
introduces the operational decisions per agent type. The transition function that describes the
state changes over time is given in Section 3.4. We define the cost functions for each agent type
and the environmental performance indicators in Section 3.5. In Section 3.6, we discuss various
solution methods that may be applied within the framework on the levels of strategic, tactical,
and operational decision-making.
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Figure 1: Conceptual flowchart of the simulation framework.
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3.1 Agent types
We design the ABS framework in a manner that allows to simultaneously evaluate company-
driven initiatives and administrative policies. Five types of agents are distinguished: receivers,
shippers, line-haul carriers, the UCC operator, and the administrator. We proceed to briefly
describe their roles; Figure 2 shows the actions, monetary flows, and information flows between
the agents, whereas Table 1 summarizes the roles and main actions of each agent type. The
actions of agents and information exchanges between agents are defined in detail in Section 3.3
and Section 3.4. The cost functions corresponding to the monetary flows are defined in Section 3.5.
We note that the real-life counterparts of the agents are not necessarily rational decision makers,
particularly when solutions require drastic changes in behavior. However, the simulation results
yield insights into the effects on real-life agents if they would change their behavior, as such
providing directions for change.
The receivers, denoted by the set R, generate order demands subject to some (stochastic)
process. Receivers may order from multiple suppliers at a single decision epoch. For each
receiver we may define fixed epochs at which orders may be placed (e.g., two epochs per week);
these ordering patterns implicitly reflect factors such as internal consolidation, storage costs, and
stockouts. This implies that no interventions can be taken to improve internal consolidation at
the receiver level. Although arguably being a strong assumption, modeling order optimization
at the receiver level would require many assumptions with respect to their operations as well.
Both to prevent indefinite postponement of order shipping and to accurately model practice,
receivers specify a delivery window for each order. In the standard situation, orders are directly
delivered by the carrier to the address of the receiver, but a receiver can also opt to select the
UCC as its delivery address. In that case, the UCC is responsible for the last-mile distribution.
Besides the costs associated with physically receiving goods, receivers also dedicate time to
value-adding services, e.g., putting clothes on hangers or unpacking bulk shipments to have
shelf-ready products. These services may be outsourced to the UCC as well.
The shippers in the framework are denoted by the set S. They act on incoming orders
from the receivers and hire carriers to transport the orders. As carriers charge relatively lower
prices for higher volumes (i.e., a lower price per volume unit), shippers have an incentive to
bundle multiple orders before shipping. However, the shippers should dispatch the orders in
time, such that the carrier is able to meet the delivery windows. For the sake of generality,
we have separated the roles of the carrier and the shipper. In practice, the shipper and carrier
might be the same actor. The shipper then has a similar incentive, as consolidation allows a
more efficient utilization of its transport resources.
Line-haul carriers, denoted by the set C, pick up goods at the shippers, and transport
them either directly to the receivers or to the UCC. The line-haul arc is represented by an
entrance vertex (near the pickup area) and an exit vertex (near the city). They may decide
to outsource their last-mile distribution to the UCC completely when this yields a financial
benefit or is enforced by regulation. In some cases, carriers may also deliver individual orders
to the UCC. When the shipper dispatches an order before the earliest delivery time, the carrier
must outsource this order to the UCC, as the carriers do not offer intermediate storage capacity
(recall that routes are completed within a single time interval). If the receiver sets the UCC as
its delivery address, the carrier must use the UCC as well for all orders destined to that receiver,
but in that case it is the receiver who pays for the last-mile delivery service. The carrier uses a
price function based on volume and line-haul distance (i.e., the distance between cities, ignoring
distance variations due to routing) that reflects economies of scale. In the typical setting that
we study, a dispatched truck will visit multiple cities during a single tour, yet we focus on a
single city only. Consequently, the load destined for the city is often considerably less than the
truck’s capacity.
The UCC receives goods from the line-haul and is responsible for their last-mile distribution.
We use a generic set notation H for UCCs, but for simplicity only consider a single UCC for the
outline of the framework. Goods are transported via the UCC if either the carrier outsources
its last-mile delivery or the receiver selects the UCC as its delivery address. At the UCC, orders
stemming from multiple carriers are bundled and may be temporarily held to account for future
consolidation opportunities. The UCC uses its own vehicles to perform the last-mile distribution.
For the UCC to be competitive, the efficiency gains on the last-mile ideally compensate for the
necessary reload costs. Additional revenues might be obtained from performing value-adding
services or redistributing external costs (e.g., by taxes and subsidies).
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Finally, the administrator implements governmental policies to influence the behavior of
agents. Since such policies are typically implemented for a longer time, we model them as
strategic decisions. The financial gains stemming from these policies might be redistributed to
subsidize agents. As mentioned, many schemes fail due to being overly dependent on subsidies.
We therefore look for schemes that are financially sustainable without requiring permanent
external cash flows. One way to achieve this involves temporary subsidies, paid until a new
equilibrium state of the system is reached. Another sustainable solution can be achieved when
the income from specific policies suffices to cover the subsidy expenses. In the latter case, the
administrator essentially monetizes and redistributes external costs.
Table 1: Summary of agent types.
Agent type Description Main actions
Receiver Located in urban area, - Place orders with shippers (based on stochastic
places orders with shippers. process)
- Decide whether to select UCC for last-mile delivery
- Decide whether to outsource value-adding services
to UCC
Shipper Facility outside urban area, - Select carrier for transport
ships based on receiver orders. - Decide a dispatch time of shipments
Carrier Conducts transport on request of shipper, - Perform transport (pickup, line-haul, and delivery)
starts routes from depot outside urban area. - Decide whether to (partially) outsource transport
UCC Located at edge of urban area, - Decide a dispatch time of orders
conducts last-mile distribution. - Perform last-mile distribution
- Perform value-adding services for receivers
Administrator Reduce emissions and freight traffic - Impose vehicle access restrictions
in urban areas by intervening. - Collect fees stemming from policies
- Allocate subsidies
3.2 State of the system
In this section, we provide the notation required to define the state of the system and the
actions of the agents. We use discrete-event simulation to model the behavior of the system
over a sequence of equidistant time intervals that typically represent several hours up to a day.
Let T = {0, 1, . . . , T} be the set of discrete decision epochs. As stated before, we distinguish
between three levels of decision making. Strategic decisions are fixed at t = 0 and remain in
effect until T . Tactical decisions are made at designated tactical decision epochs t ∈ T tac ⊂ T .
Operational decisions are made at every t ∈ T .
We define an abstract network consisting of a pickup area with shipper locations and the
home depots of carriers, a line-haul distance, and the urban area with receiver locations and
a single UCC. Figure 3 shows a typical network setting for the framework. The network is
comprised by a vertex set V and an arc set A. Vertex set V is defined as V = VR∪VS∪VC∪VH ,
i.e., the set consists of subsets of locations of receivers VR, shippers VS , carriers VC , and the UCC
VH . As we consider a single UCC location for the sake of illustration, we define VH = {vucc},
with vucc denoting the UCC location in the network. Every arc a ∈ A connects a vertex pair
(va, v
′
a), with va, v
′
a ∈ V and va 6= v′a.
We proceed with the order properties. Let L = { 1
y
, 2
y
, . . . , 1} (with integer y > 1) be the set
of possible order volumes, with a volume of 1 being equal to the volume of the smallest vehicle in
the model (e.g., a delivery van). Let T e be the set of possible earliest delivery times (relative to
t) and T w be the set of possible widths of the delivery window. We define an order as a request
to ship a certain load, with an order type being a unique combination of the delivery window
[t + te, t + tl] (with te ∈ T e and tl − te ∈ T w), the current position of the order v ∈ V (which
indicates the agent responsible for handling the order at t), the receiver r ∈ R, the carrier c ∈ C,
the shipper s ∈ S, the order volume l ∈ L, and an indicator γ ∈ {0, 1} that specifies whether
delivery should take place via the UCC (γ = 1 sets the UCC as the delivery address for the
carrier). The indicator γ can be specified either by the receiver or by the carrier. To denote
which agent is responsible for the order, we expand the vertex notation with a superscript (rec,
car, shp, ucc) and a subscript r ∈ R, c ∈ C, s ∈ S, e.g., vshps when shipper s holds an order.
The order type of an order changes during the simulation. As the delivery window is defined
relative to the decision epoch t, it must be updated after each time step. Furthermore, decisions
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Figure 2: Overview of the (inter)actions, monetary flows, and information flows for each agent type.
regarding the use of the UCC may alter the order type. The transition functions that describe
how orders change type are defined in Section 3.4. The number of orders of a specific type in
the system at time t is denoted by It,te,tl,v,r,c,s,l,γ ∈ N. The vector It describes the number of
every order type in the system at time t and is defined as:
It = [It,te,tl,v,r,c,s,l,γ ]∀te,tl,v,r,c,s,l,γ∈T e×T w×V×R×C×S×L×{0,1} . (1)
For notational convenience, we omit the set notations in subscripts from here on. The
notation It describes all orders in the system at t. As explained before, we indicate the orders
relevant for a specific agent (for which we use the term order position) with the appropriate
vertex, e.g., a subscript vcarc implies that carrier c is currently responsible for the order. Thus,
carrier c at time t has an order position It,te,tl,vcarc ,r,c,s,l,γ , ∀t
e, tl, r, s, l, γ. As order types are
defined by a sequential decision-making process that involves multiple agent types, several
indices of the order type are left undefined during the process. For instance, a receiver does not
specify which carrier delivers the order; this index is left blank in the specification of the order
type or the action – which we denote by a dot in place of the unspecified index – until it is
specified by the shipper. The decision-making process that defines the order types is described
in Section 3.3.
The model keeps track of the agents that utilize the UCC. The variable γrect,r ∈ {0, 1}
indicates whether receiver r sets the UCC as its delivery address at decision epoch t; the
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Figure 3: Example of a network with a UCC enabling carriers to outsource last-mile distribution.
variable γcart,c ∈ {0, 1} has the same purpose for carriers. These variables might be fixed for
longer periods of time; we discuss strategic and tactical decision making in Section 3.6. In
total there are |R| receivers and |C| line-haul carriers; the vectors γrect = [γrect,1 , . . . , γrect,|R|] and
γcart = [γ
car
t,1 , . . . , γ
car
t,|C|] describe which receiver and carrier agents are committed to the UCC at
time t. The state of the system at t is defined by St = [It, γ
rec
t , γ
car
t ]; this description provides
all information required for the agents to make decisions and to compute the performance
indicators.
3.3 Definition of dispatching decisions
In some form, every agent – except the administrator – is faced with a dispatching decision
based on its order position. For a given agent (again indicated by the appropriate vertex
in the subscripts), the dispatching decision may be generally defined by xt,te,tl,v,r,c,s,l,γ ≤
It,te,tl,v,r,c,s,l,γ∀te, tl, r, c, s, l, γ. Depending on the context, a dispatching decision is either a
physical transfer of orders (e.g., the carrier picks up orders at the shipper) or an information
transfer of order properties (e.g., the receiver places an order with the shipper). The dispatching
decision of one agent transfers the responsibility for the dispatched orders to other agents (e.g.,
from shipper to carrier); the dispatching decisions are made sequentially by the various agent
types. As shown earlier, the current decision maker is indicated by the vertex in the subscript
of an action or order position. Physically, orders move downstream from shipper to receiver
via the carrier (and possibly via the UCC). In the basic version of the framework, information
transfers of order properties only take place between receivers and shippers, i.e., through the
placement of orders. Both types of actions have in common that they update the (physical or
virtual) order positions of other agents.
The dispatching decision for the receiver r ∈ R is the information transfer of its demand
arising between time t− 1 and time t, i.e., it places an order at the shippers that is equal to its
demand. The carrier is undefined at this point. When placing the order, the receiver specifies
a delivery window [t + te, t + tl]. A value te > 0 implies that the order must be held either at
the shipper location or at the UCC before the earliest delivery time. The dispatching decision
by receiver r ∈ R is defined as:
xt,te,tl,vrecr ,r,·,s,l,γ := It,te,tl,vrecr ,r,·,s,l,γ ∀t
e, tl, s, l, γ . (2)
The dispatching decision for the shipper is a physical dispatching decision. Although Figure 1
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also describes the possibility to pre-announce order arrivals to the UCC (i.e., an information
transfer), we ignore this action to simplify the mathematical formulation of actions and transitions.
By accumulating orders, the shipper may achieve lower average transport costs, yet the delivery
windows imposed by the receivers must be respected. At every decision epoch t, the shipper s
must select a carrier c ∈ C to perform the transport for the dispatched orders (i.e., one carrier
for the complete shipment at t). We introduce the binary variable zt,c,s ∈ {0, 1} to describe this
choice. The dispatching decision of shipper s ∈ S is given by:
[x
t,te,tl,v
shp
s ,r,c,s,l,γ
]∀te,tl,r,c,l,γ , (3)
s.t.
∑
c∈C
zt,c,s · xt,te,tl,vshps ,r,c,s,l,γ ≤ It,te,tl,vshps ,r,c,s,l,γ t
l > 1,∀te, r, l, γ , (4)
∑
c∈C
zt,c,s · xt,0,1,vshps ,r,c,s,l,γ = It,0,1,vshps ,r,c,s,l,γ ∀r, l, γ , (5)
x
t,te,tl,v
shp
s ,r,c,s,l,0
= 0 te > 0, ∀tl, r, c, l , (6)∑
c∈C
zt,c,s = 1 , (7)
x
t,te,tl,v
shp
s ,r,c,s,l,γ
∈ N ∀te, tl, r, c, l, γ , (8)
zt,c,s ∈ {0, 1} ∀c . (9)
Constraint (4) states thatno more orders of any order type for receiver r are shipped than
that are placed by the receiver. Constraint (5) ensures that orders are shipped in time, such
that the carrier or UCC can make the delivery to the receiver before the last allowed delivery
time (given our assumption that all routes, including the line-haul component, are completed
within a single time interval). Constraint (6) states that – if the order does not have the UCC
as its delivery address – the shipper cannot ship orders before the earliest delivery date; this
is because the carrier does not offer intermediate storage capacity. With Constraint (7), we
enforce that exactly 1 carrier is selected to conduct the transport of the shipment, i.e., all orders
that are dispatched by the shipper at time t (a carrier may use more than 1 truck for this).
Constraint (8) and Constraint (9) are domain constraints.
The dispatching decision of the carrier is equivalent to transporting all orders that are
physically released by the shippers to the carrier. To simplify the mathematical presentation,
we impose that orders that are released by the shipper at t are picked up and delivered by the
carrier between t and t + 1. Recall that orders with te > 0 can only be delivered to the UCC;
unlike the UCC and the shipper, the carrier does not offer a temporary storage service. We
define the dispatching decision of a carrier c ∈ C as follows:
xt,te,tl,vcarc ,r,c,s,l,γ := It,te,tl,vcarc ,r,c,s,l,γ ∀t
e, tl, r, s, l, γ . (10)
Finally, the definition of the dispatching decision for the UCC is similar to that of the shipper,
although without the constraints relating to the carrier selection:
[xt,te,tl,vucc,r,c,s,l,1]∀te,tl,r,c,s,l,1 , (11)
s.t.
xt,0,tl,vucc,r,c,s,l,1 ≤ It,0,tl,vucc,r,c,s,l,1 ∀tl, r, c, s, l , (12)
xt,0,1,vucc,r,c,s,l,1 = It,0,1,vucc,r,c,s,l,1 ∀r, c, s, l , (13)
xt,te,tl,vucc,r,c,s,l,1 = 0 t
e > 0, ∀tl, r, c, s, l , (14)
xt,te,tl,vucc,r,c,s,l,1 ∈ N ∀te, tl, r, c, s, l . (15)
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3.4 Transition function
Having defined the state of the system and the corresponding actions, we proceed to describe the
transition function. We first introduce the stochastic order arrival process. Let I˜t,te,tl,vrecr ,r,·,s,l,· ∈
N denote the number of arrivals of a given order type during the time interval (t − 1, t]. We
denote all arrivals during this interval by ωt = [I˜t,te,tl,vrecr ,r,·,s,l,·]∀te,tl,r,s,l and the set of all
possible arrivals by Ωt. Let Wt be a random variable with ωt ∈ Ωt being a realization of Wt.
As we consider a system with interacting agents, the actions of one agent affect the order
positions of other agents. Dispatching decisions may also transform order types, e.g., when
the carrier decides to deliver via the UCC. We describe the transition function as a sequential
updating procedure. The influence that the actions of one agent have on the order position of
another agent is represented by the vertex subscripts. For example, in the dispatching decision
of a receiver r (communicating an order placement to the shipper), the subscript vrecr is specified.
Processing this decision updates the order position of the shipper, updating the subscript vshps ,
implying that the decision of the receiver affects the order position of the shipper.
We split the transition function into two components. First, we address the transitions
occurring at a given decision epoch t as a result of the dispatching actions of the agents. Second,
we describe the transition that occurs when making the discrete time step from t to t + 1,
comprising the order arrival process and the update of time indices. At various points, we use
the post-decision order position, which is the position after applying a dispatching decision on
the order position, but before the arrival of new orders (i.e., before the discrete time step).
Notations that relate to the post-decision order position are defined with a superscript x.
We start with an initial order position It, in which numbers of order types greater than 0 may
exist for the receivers (newly generated orders according to the realization of Wt), the shippers
(existing order positions), and the UCC (existing order position). From this initial position, we
proceed to move to the post-decision position Ixt via a sequential updating procedure that we
outline below.
The demand of receiver r ∈ R for a given order type is defined by the variable It,te,tl,vrecr ,r,·,s,l,· ∈
N; the carrier and the use of the UCC are initially undefined, hence the dots · in the notation.
If γrect,r = 1 (which may be fixed at the tactical or strategic level), this means that the receiver
will use the UCC as its delivery address, thus we must set γ = 1 for all its orders. If γrect,r = 0,
the receiver is indifferent as to whether it will be delivered directly or via the UCC, meaning
that this choice remains open to the carrier. The index for γ is left blank in that case. Thus,
iff γrect,r = 1, we perform the following update for receiver r:
It,te,tl,vrecr ,r,·,s,l,1 := It,te,tl,vrecr ,r,·,s,l,· ∀t
e, tl, s, l .
Subsequently, we reset all order positions of receivers without a specified value for γ (i.e.,
γrect,r = ·) by performing the update It,te,tl,vrecr ,r,·,s,l,· := 0 ∀t
e, tl, s, l.
The orders placed by the receiver are converted into an action according to Equation (2).
After obtaining the action of the receiver, it is communicated to the shipper, which results in
an update of the order position of the shipper. At this stage, the carrier c is still undefined. To
obtain the order position of a shipper s ∈ S at t, the order requests by the receivers are added
to the already existing order positions of shippers, which follows from the post-decision position
at t− 1. To consistently describe the update at t, we therefore first show how we compute the
post-decision order position at t− 1. The shipper selects an action as defined in Equation (3).
By dispatching the orders, we can compute the post-decision order position for shipper s as
follows:
Ix
t−1,te,tl,vshps ,r,·,s,l,γ = It−1,te,tl,vshps ,r,·,s,l,γ −
∑
c∈C
x
t−1,te,tl,vshps ,r,c,s,l,γ ∀t
e, tl, r, l, γ .
The order position of the shipper at t follows from the post-decision order position at t− 1
and the orders posed by the receivers at t. To take into account the time update of delivery
windows relative to the current decision epoch, we must update the order types of existing
orders in the order position. Most time indices te and tl are simply reduced by 1, as they are
relative to t. However, orders with an earliest delivery time te = 0 or te = 1 relative to t − 1
both correspond to te = 0 at the current decision epoch t. We incorporate this update with the
help variable t˜e. The update of the order position at t is defined as follows:
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I
t,0,tl,v
shp
s ,r,·,s,l,γ =
1∑
t˜e=0
(Ix
t−1,t˜e,tl+1,vshps ,r,·,s,l,γ) + xt,0,tl,vrecr ,r,·,s,l,γ ∀t
l, r, l, γ ,
I
t,te,tl,v
shp
s ,r,·,s,l,γ = I
x
t−1,te+1,tl+1,vshps ,r,·,s,l,γ + xt,te,tl,vrecr ,r,·,s,l,γ t
e > 0, ∀tl, r, l, γ .
We proceed with the update at the carrier level based on its decision whether to use the
UCC. Based on the decision variables γcart,c and γ
rec
t,r , the value for γ may be updated. If γ = 1
due to the preceding decision of the receiver, the carrier cannot set γ = 0. However, if γrect,r = 0,
the index γ has not been defined and will be determined by the carrier. The update of the order
types for carrier c is defined by:
It,te,tl,vcarc ,r,c,s,l,0 := It,te,tl,vcarc ,r,c,s,l,· ∀t
e, tl, r, s, l if γcart,c = 0 ,
It,te,tl,vcarc ,r,c,s,l,1 := It,te,tl,vcarc ,r,c,s,l,· ∀t
e, tl, r, s, l if γcart,c = 1 .
After completing the update for γ, the number of orders for types characterized by γ = · are
set to 0: It,te,tl,vcarc ,r,c,s,l,· := 0 ∀t
e, tl, r, s, l.
We proceed with the inventory update of the UCC. The inventory at time t depends on the
post-decision order position at t− 1 and the dispatching decisions by the carriers taken at t, as
defined in Equation (10). We first describe how we compute the post-decision order position of
the UCC, again starting with the post-decision order position at t−1. For a given (pre-decision)
order position, the UCC makes its dispatching decision as defined in Equation (11), which is
used to compute its post-decision order position:
Ixt−1,te,tl,vucc,r,c,s,l,1 = It−1,te,tl,vucc,r,c,s,l,1 − xt−1,te,tl,vucc,r,c,s,l,1 ∀te, tl, r, c, s, l .
The inventory position of the UCC at t depends on the existing inventory from t − 1 and
the dispatching decisions by the carriers taken at t, as defined in Equation (10). Based on this
information, we update the inventory position of the UCC as follows:
It,0,tl,vucc,r,c,s,l,1 =
1∑
t˜e=0
(Ixt−1,t˜e,tl+1,vucc,r,c,s,l,1) + xt,0,tl,vcarc ,r,c,s,l,1 ∀t
l, r, c, s, l ,
It,te,tl,vucc,r,c,s,l,1 = I
x
t−1,te+1,tl+1,vucc,r,c,s,l,1 + xt,te,tl,vcarc ,r,c,s,l,1 t
e > 0,∀tl, r, c, s, l .
Having defined the sequential procedure to obtain the post-decision order position of the
system, we proceed to describe the transition from post-decision order position Ixt−1 to the next
pre-decision order position It, comprising the processing of new order arrivals and the update
of time indices. First, the receiver orders are generated based on the realization of the random
variable Wt+1. At this point, the carrier c and the indicator γ are still undefined. For receiver
r, its order position at t+ 1 is given by:
It+1,te,tl,vrecr ,r,·,s,l,· = I˜t+1,te,tl,vrecr ,r,·,s,l,· ∀t
e, tl, s, l .
For each shipper s, we need to update the time indices of its order position, i.e., the post-
decision position at decision epoch t. This time update goes as follows:
I
t+1,0,tl,v
shp
s ,r,·,s,l,γ =
1∑
t˜e=0
Ix
t,t˜e,tl+1,v
shp
s ,r,·,s,l,γ ∀t
l, r, l ,
I
t+1,te,tl,v
shp
s ,r,·,s,l,γ = I
x
t,te+1,tl+1,v
shp
s ,r,·,s,l,γ t
e > 0, ∀tl, r, l .
The time update for the UCC is comparable:
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It+1,0,tl,vucc,r,c,s,l,1 =
1∑
t˜e=0
Ixt,t˜e,tl+1,vucc,r,c,s,l,1 ∀tl, r, c, s, l ,
It+1,te,tl,vucc,r,c,s,l,1 = I
x
t,te+1,tl+1,vucc,r,c,s,l,1 t
e > 0∀tl, r, c, s, l .
3.5 Cost functions and Key Performance Indicators
In this section, we provide the cost (profit) functions and Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) of
the agents. We start by introducing some notation for the price functions P (describing income)
and cost functions C (describing expenses). For a variety of parameters and variables, we use
the superscript hd to refer to costs for handling operations (e.g., (un)loading by the driver), rc
for receiving (e.g., working hours spent on receiving, quality control of goods, and allocation
to shelves), sp for shipping (e.g., loading operations), and sb for income from subsidies. In the
description, we restrict ourselves to subsidies for using the UCC; schemes that subsidize other
initiatives may be modeled in a comparable manner. The used order volumes depend on the
context of the function. For example, the volume transported by carrier c at time t to the UCC
is given by
lt,·,·,vcarc ,·,c,·,·,1 =
∑
te,tl,r,s,l
xt,te,tl,vcarc ,r,c,s,l,1 · l .
We proceed with the notation required to describe the routes. Let Qc denote the set of
vehicles operated by carrier (or UCC) c ∈ C ∪ H. A vehicle q ∈ Qc has a capacity ≥ 1. The
smallest vehicle defined in the simulation model has a capacity of 1, order sizes and the capacities
of other vehicles are defined relative to this volume. To ease the notation, we assume that all
routes starting at t are completed at t + 1. For the same reason, we do not explicitly include
the collection of orders at shipper locations. We denote a route started by vehicle q of carrier c
at time t by δcart,c,q = {δcar,lht,c,q , δcar,lmt,c,q }, with the components referring to line-haul transport and
last-mile distribution respectively. This distinction is used to assign distinct properties (e.g.,
fuel usage, road pricing, driver wage) to the associated travel distances ηlh and ηlm. We let
∆cart,c denote the set of routes for carrier c at decision epoch t and use ∆
ucc
t to describe the
set of routes for the UCC. The UCC only has to deal with last-mile distribution, such that
δucct,q = {δucc,lmt,q }. We use ∆t = [[∆cart,c ]∀c∈C ,∆ucct ] to denote all routes starting at time t.
For the carriers and the UCC, handling costs depend on the subsets of locations visited.
The carrier incurs handling costs at each shipper of the subset S ′ ⊆ S that it visits to collect
shipments at a given decision epoch. Both carriers and receivers incur handling costs at each
location in the subset of receivers visited R′ ⊆ R ∪ H (note that the UCC is a receiver from
the perspective of the carrier). For each agent that conducts transport, the subsets S ′ and R′,
as well as the distances ηlh and ηlm are derived from the route sets ∆cart,c and ∆
ucc
t . To clarify
which aspect of a route is responsible for a particular cost or price component (i.e., the costs
per km driven or the loading costs per shipper visited), we use the subsets S ′ and R′ and the
distances ηlh and ηlm in our definitions of cost and price functions, rather than the generic route
notation.
We now introduce the cost functions for the agents. The outcomes of these cost functions
over the full time horizon T serve as KPIs for the agents. To be consistent in our notation,
we express the performance of each agent in terms of costs; price components are included as
negative costs. Although agents aim to minimize their costs over the full planning horizon, they
make periodic decisions based on incomplete information.
The objective of the shipper is to minimize the sum of transport costs and shipping costs.
Shippers can influence these costs by selecting the set of orders to ship at every decision epoch
and select the cheapest carrier to conduct the transport of this order set, see Equation (3). The
costs for shipper s at time t are given by
Cshpt,s (lt,·,·,vshps ,·,c,s,·,·, η
lh) =Cshp,trt,s (lt,·,·,vshps ,·,c,s,·,·, η
lh) + Cshp,spt,s (lt,·,·,vshps ,·,c,s,·,·) .
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Carriers attempt to maximize profit (determined by the transport price, subsidy income,
transport costs, and outsourcing costs) by selecting the route set ∆car,xt,c that minimizes costs at
every decision epoch. In addition, carriers can choose whether they perform the full transport
themselves or outsource the last-mile transport to the UCC. In case of outsourcing, the carrier
only pays for outsourcing volume that is not already outsourced by the receiver, i.e., only the
volume characterized by γ = ·. In case subsidies are provided, they only apply to this volume.
The cost function of a carrier c at time t is given by
Ccart,c (lt,·,·,vcarc ,·,c,·,·,·, lt,·,·,vcarc ,·,c,·,·,1, η
lh, ηlm, γcart,c ,S ′,R′) =
Ccar,trt,c (η
lh, ηlm,S ′,R′)− P car,trt,c (lt,·,·,vcarc ,·,c,·,·,·, ηlh) if γcart,c = 0 ,
Ccar,trt,c (η
lh, 0,S ′, h) + Ccar,lmt,c (lt,·,·,vcarc ,·,c,·,·,·, ηlh,S ′)
−P car,trt,c (lt,·,·,vcarc ,·,c,·,·,·, ηlh)− P car,sbt,c (lt,·,·,vcarc ,·,c,·,·,·) if γcart,c = 1 .
The objective of the UCC is to maximize profit, which is determined by the prices it charges,
subsidy incomes, receiving costs, costs for performing value-adding services, and transport costs.
If the receiver decides to select the UCC as its delivery address, it is the receiver that pays
the UCC for the last-mile distribution costs. If the carrier decides to outsource its last-mile
distribution, it only pays the UCC for the volume that has not already been outsourced by
the receiver. To influence its profit, the UCC selects a subset of orders to dispatch at every
decision epoch, as defined in Equation (11), which yields a corresponding route set ∆ucct . The
cost function for the UCC at time t is defined by
Cucct (lt,·,·,vucc,·,·,·,·,1, η
lm,R′) =
Cucc,rct (lt,·,·,vucc,·,·,·,·,1) + C
ucc,tr
t (lt,·,·,vucc,·,·,·,·,1, η
lm,R′)+∑
r∈R′
Cucc,rec,valt (lt,·,·,vrecr ,r,·,·,·,1)−
Pucc,sbt (lt,·,·,vucc,·,·,·,·,1)−
∑
r∈R′
γrect,r · Pucc,rec,trt (lt,·,·,vucc,r,·,·,·,1)−∑
c∈C′
γcart,c P
ucc,car,tr
t (lt,·,·,vcarc ,·,c,·,·,1)−
∑
r∈R′
Pucc,valt (r) .
The performance of the receiver is measured as the sum of receiving costs. These depend
on whether delivery takes place via the UCC. If the receiver does not mandate delivery via the
UCC, it incurs costs for every carrier (possibly including the UCC) that delivers goods at the
receiver. Furthermore, the receiver must perform its value-adding services in-house and incurs
a cost for that. If the receiver mandates deliveries via the UCC, the receiver pays the UCC
for last-mile delivery, but may incur lower receiving costs due to receiving bundled orders from
only one carrier (i.e., the UCC). If applicable, the receiver also incurs costs for outsourcing its
value-adding services. The costs for a receiver r at time t are given by:
Crect,r (lt,·,·,vrecr ,r,·,·,·,·, lt,·,·,vrecr ,r,·,·,·,1, γ
rec
t,r ) =
Crec,rct,r (lt,·,·,vrecr ,r,·,·,·,·) + C
rec,val
t,r if γ
rec
t,r = 0 ,
Crec,rct,r (lt,·,·,vrecr ,r,·,·,·,1) + C
rec,lm
t,r (lt,·,·,vrecr ,r,·,·,·,1)+ if γ
rec
t,r = 1
Crec,val,ucct,r − P rec,sbt,r (lt,·,·,vrecr ,r,·,·,·,1) .
The performance of the administrator is measured with the following KPIs: (i) the number
of vehicles per type that enter the urban area, (ii) the total distance covered within the urban
area per vehicle type, (iii) the income from policies minus the provided subsidies, and (iv) the
emission levels for CO2, SO2, NOx, and particulate matter (PM). The first two KPIs indirectly
capture effects such as noise hindrance and the contribution to road congestion. The third KPI
is an indicator for the financial feasibility of a scheme.
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3.6 Solution methods for decision-making
In this section, we describe various solutions methods that may be applied in the framework.
We distinguish between solution methods for the strategic level (Section 3.6.1), the tactical
level (Section 3.6.2), and the operational level (Section 3.6.3). The descriptions of the solution
methods are deliberately kept at an abstract level, as the applicability of methods depends on
factors such as the required level of detail and the computational budget.
3.6.1 Solution methods for strategic decisions
Strategic decisions are embedded in the framework as pre-defined input; they are fixed at t = 0
and agents are committed to them for the full planning horizon. Typically, strategic decisions
may be incorporated into the network by defining arc properties. We discuss implementation
guidelines for two classes of strategic decisions, namely administrative policies and company-
driven initiatives.
Administrative policies are typically described by forms of access restrictions or access
pricing. Such policies are incorporated in the framework by (i) defining restrictions and pricing
functions as arc properties, (ii) defining the cost allocation structure, and (iii) specifying rules
for subsidies. Although we model the decision to award subsidies as a strategic one, allocation
rules and time thresholds may be defined in such a way that a dynamic distribution of subsidies
remains possible.
Company-driven initiatives that may permanently affect agents are, e.g., buying vehicles of
a certain type or establishing a communication structure between supply chain partners. To
reflect such strategic decisions, the characteristics of the agents may be adjusted in the model.
Initiatives that reorganize either the infrastructure or the transport process can be incorporated
by modifying the network.
We conclude with a brief outline on setting up coalition structures in the framework, e.g.,
synchronizing delivery windows or pooling orders and resources. First, the agents that may
enter the coalition should be specified. Second, the action space of the coalition needs to be
defined, including rules for the allocation of tasks to agents. Third, a single objective function
must be specified for the coalition. Fourth – as coalitions require rational agents that are willing
to cooperate – an appropriate gain-sharing mechanism (e.g., from the field of cooperative game
theory) should be incorporated.
3.6.2 Solution methods for tactical decisions
Tactical decisions in the simulation framework are made only at a pre-defined subset of decision
epochs T tac ⊂ T . These decisions commit agents for at least the time period between two
adjacent decision epochs. Examples of tactical decisions are committing to outsource last-mile
distribution to the UCC or adjusting the price levels of services. In this subsection, we discuss
a sampling procedure to make decisions on the tactical level.
Although the range of tactical decisions might be diverse, the common characteristic of
tactical decisions is that they affect the performance of agents over a time period of medium
length. Therefore, each agent should evaluate how its future performance is affected by its
tactical decisions. One approach to evaluate the impact of tactical decisions is to measure
performance over some past time interval and compare it to the performance that might have
been achieved under other tactical decisions. However, if the state of the system changes
over time (e.g., altered prices or subsidies), lookahead estimates typically yield more accurate
expected values.
We exemplify the lookahead procedure as follows. Consider a receiver that must decide
whether to select the UCC as its delivery address. The receiver aims to minimize its expected
receiving costs until the next tactical decision moment. For this purpose, N sample paths of
order arrivals of length τsample are generated, with n ∈ {1, . . . , N} representing the index for
the sample path and tn ∈ {0, . . . , τsample} representing the time index for the sample states of
path n. The obtained sets of sample arrivals are denoted by {ω˜n0 , . . . , ω˜nτsample},∀n ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
From these samples we derive order volumes for the receiver that are denoted by ltn,·,·,vrecr ,r,·,·,·,·
(the total volume) and ltn,·,·,vrecr ,r,·,·,·,1 (the volume delivered via the UCC). Let γ˜
rec
r ∈ {0, 1}
be a binary variable indicating whether receiver r uses the UCC in the lookahead procedure; to
compare both options we compute the costs for γ˜recr = 0 as well as for γ˜
rec
r = 1. In mathematical
form, the following minimization problem is solved to update the tactical decision:
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γrect,r = arg min
γ˜recr ∈{0,1}
C˜rec(γ˜recr , lt′,·,·,vrecr ,r,·,·,·,·, lt′,·,·,vrecr ,r,·,·,·,1) .
The sample costs C˜rec(γ˜recr , ltn,·,·,vrecr ,r,·,·,·,·), computed for the N paths, are calculated as
follows:
C˜rec(γ˜recr , ltn,·,·,vrecr ,r,·,·,·,·) =
1
N
∑N
n=1
∑τsample
tn=0
(
Crec,rctn,r (ltn,·,·,vrecr ,r,·,·,·,·) + C
rec,val
tn,r
)
if γ˜recr = 0 ,
1
N
∑N
n=1
∑τsample
tn=0
(
Crec,rctn,r (ltn,·,·,vrecr ,r,·,·,·,·) + C
rec,lm
tn,r (ltn,·,·,vrecr ,r,·,·,·,·)
+Crec,val,ucctn,r − P rec,sbtn,r (ltn,·,·,vrecr ,r,·,·,·,·)
)
if γ˜recr = 1 .
The sampling procedure assumes that agents respond instantly to changes in the system such
as new price levels. These levels are adjusted before updating the tactical decisions. In practice,
decision makers might display a more gradual approach in altering their tactical decisions. Such
behavior may be reflected by incorporating learning mechanisms such as Q-learning, which place
weight on both past observations and future expectations of state-action values. This results
in a smoother transition of the state of the system. Although learning mechanisms may reflect
the behavior of real-life actors more accurately, the downside is that more computational effort
is likely required to identify the steady state (if such a state exists) of the system.
3.6.3 Solution methods for operational decisions
All agents aim to optimize their own objective functions. As we model a dynamic environment,
operational decision problems are subject to incomplete information. Exact solution methods for
stochastic problems usually require a large computational effort, which is why we typically resort
to heuristic solutions in ABS. Various policies may be used to tackle the operational decision
problems. The specific policies to be used depend on the instance, the learning objectives of the
simulation study, and the computational budget.
Both the shippers and the UCC face a variant of the Delivery Dispatching Problem with time
windows (DDP-TW) that is described in Van Heeswijk, Mes, and Schutten (2017). In the DDP-
TW, the agent must decide at each decision epoch which subset of orders to dispatch. The goal
is to dispatch the orders in batches that allow for efficient delivery tours. Shippers face a simple
variant of the problem as we model only one line-haul arc, UCCs face a more complicated variant
as their routing costs depend on the subset of locations visited. Possible solution methods are
learning a dispatching policy with ADP, a lookahead policy based on sampling, or a heuristic
policy; Van Heeswijk, Mes, and Schutten (2017) describe all three variants.
Carriers, as well as the UCC, are required to solve a vehicle routing problem (VRP). Orders
arrive via the line-haul arc, implying a single entry point to the city that functions as the
starting point of the urban delivery route. For orders that are delivered via the UCC, the UCC
location is the starting point of the urban delivery route. In Section 2 we gave an overview
of VRP methods specifically designed to deal with the context of urban logistics. As we split
the decision problem into a periodic dispatch decision and a vehicle routing problem, solution
methods for the static VRP may be applied.
4 Numerical experiments
In this section, we demonstrate the working of the simulation framework using numerical
experiments. The purpose of the experiments is threefold. First, they show a tangible application
of the framework. Second, we present metrics with respect to the computational time required
to complete the experiments. Third, we provide insights into effective urban logistics schemes.
The section is structured as follows. Section 4.1 describes the properties of the instance and
the used parameter settings. Section 4.2 discusses the setup and implementation details of the
experiments. Section 4.3 outlines the solution methods used by the agents. Finally, Section 4.4
presents and discusses the results of the numerical experiments.
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4.1 Instance properties
We describe the properties of the test instance and the parameter settings, focusing on the
general outline and motivating our design choices.
We represent the city by a square area of 1km2 that contains 100 uniformly distributed
receiver locations. Furthermore, we assume a 10km2 square area that is located 100km away
from the urban area (i.e., the line-haul distance); this area contains 30 shipper locations and 30
carrier depots, which are uniformly spread.
We proceed to describe the receiver properties. We assume that each receiver uses a
decentralized supply system, i.e., it places orders with multiple shippers. According to Cherrett
et al. (2012), such receivers approximately receive about 12 distinct deliveries per week; we
randomly generate 6-20 orders per receiver per week (3-5 order days and 2-4 orders per order
day), with the delivery window for each order being a random day of the week. The volume per
order is drawn from a set of 10 volumes (expressed in m3) in the range [0.24, 6.44] (Van Heeswijk
2017), assuming a triangular distribution with mean 1.67m3. The unloading time at each receiver
(from the perspective of the carrier) is uniformly drawn from the range of 7 to 34 minutes
(Schoemaker et al. 2006, Allen et al. 2008). However, the receiver itself is not necessarily
involved in the entire unloading process, and might therefore spend less time on receiving than
the carrier does on unloading. We estimate that the receiving time lies between 2 minutes
and the unloading time for the carrier, again drawing from a uniform distribution. We set the
staff costs for a retailer at e15.3/hour (Van Duin, Quak, and Mun˜uzuri 2010); in conjunction
with the time spent on unloading, this determines the receiving costs. The monthly cost for
value-adding services – when performed in-house – is uniformly drawn from the range e30-100.
Next, we discuss the transport-related properties. Carriers use medium-sized trucks with a
load capacity of 28m3 and the UCC uses light trucks with a load capacity of 18m3; there are
always sufficient trucks to transport loads > 1. We assume that the light trucks are exempted
from any access restrictions imposed by the administrator. The financial and environmental
properties of these truck types are based on Quak and de Koster (2009), Boer, Otten, and Essen
(2011), and Roca-Riu, Estrada, and Ferna´ndez (2016). Table 2 summarizes these properties.
As emissions are strongly correlated, we only use PM2.5 emission for the experiments.
For the UCC, we also set parameters for the costs of their non-transport operations and
prices for their services. Following Van Duin, Quak, and Mun˜uzuri (2010), we set a cost range
of 11-19 e/m3 handled at the UCC. The costs are initialized at e19 (assuming an initial state
in which the UCC has no customers) and reduces to e11 when all inbound volume is handled
by the UCC. Between these bounds, the costs are computed linearly with respect to the ratio
between volume handled by the UCC and total inbound volume. For the value-adding services,
we assume that the costs are initially 80% of the in-house costs, but linearly decrease with the
volume ratio to 50% of the costs. The price for value-adding services as charged to the receiver
is determined based on the cost price for the UCC; we use a default profit margin of 30%. The
receiver price for the service of bundled deliveries is set at e70 per month and may linearly
decrease to e60 per month (Van Heeswijk 2017). For the carriers, each outsourced stop costs
between e12 and e18.
Table 2: Vehicle properties for light trucks (UCC) and medium-sized truck (carriers).
Property Light truck Medium-sized truck
Load capacity (m3) 18 28
Costs urban transport (e/km) 1.56 1.70
Costs line-haul transport (e/km) – 1.24
Urban driving speed (km/hour) 25 25
Line-haul driving speed (km/hour) – 50
PM2.5 (mg/km) 36 56
4.2 Experimental setup
We describe the setup of our experiments. We select a set of six variables that each have two
levels (default and intervention), which we combine in a 2k factorial design that yields 26 = 64
experiments. We perform 10 replications per experiment, the reported results are averages. The
settings are summarized in Table 3. Variable A sets the access time window for medium-sized
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trucks; under the intervention level, these trucks are only allowed in the urban area during a
two-hour interval each day. Variable B sets the subsidy level for carriers that outsource their
last-mile distribution to the UCC; in the intervention setting they get 30% of the price paid to
the UCC reimbursed by the local administrator. Variable C is the zone-access fee, which we
set at e10 per medium-sized truck that enters the city. Variable D sets the profit margin of
the UCC that determines its price levels, with the intervention setting reflecting a non-profit
UCC. Variable E indicates whether or not the carriers form a coalition in which all transport
jobs are bundled. Finally, variable F relates to the dispatch threshold that shippers maintain
before shipping accumulated sets of orders; the intervention setting is 18m3.
Table 3: Variable levels (default and intervention).
Variable Description Default setting Intervention setting
A Access time window 24h/day 2h/day
B Carrier subsidies 0% 30%
C Zone access fee e0 e10
D UCC margin value-adding services 30% 0%
E Carrier coalition No Yes
F Shipper dispatch threshold 0m3 18m3
We proceed to describe the implementation details of the framework. The framework is
coded as a discrete-event simulation model in Delphi XE6 and runs on a computer with 8GB
RAM and a 2.90GHz Intel Core i7 processor. The planning horizon contains 1250 decision
epochs and corresponds to a five-year period (assuming 250 working days per year); the set of
tactical decisions contains 50 epochs that are separated by equidistant time intervals. Subsidies
are allocated during the first two years and then reset to 0. All reported results are taken from
the last two years of the period, implying a one-year transition period. The uncertainty in the
system is represented by randomly generating the information variables Wt.
4.3 Choice of solution methods
We describe the solution methods that are used by the agents on the three levels of decision-
making, starting with the strategic level. These decisions correspond to the variables mentioned
in Table 3. The access time window, zone-access fee, and carrier subsidies are incorporated as
network properties; recall that the subsidies are set to 0 after two years. The volume thresholds
for shippers and the profit margin of the UCC are fixed input. For the carrier coalition, we
assume that all carriers bundle their transport jobs and that one randomly selected carrier
executes the transport at a given decision epoch. To compute the KPIs, we simply measure the
coalition-wide costs and prices divided by the number of carriers. Thus, we implicitly assume
that the coalition partners are able to agree on a fair gain-sharing mechanism.
The tactical decisions in the numerical experiments are adjusting the price levels of the UCC
and the decision whether to outsource last-mile distribution to the UCC (both by carriers and
by receivers). The lookahead procedure corresponding to these decisions has been described in
Section 3.6.2; the sample costs are computed over a period of one month.
We proceed with the operational decisions. For shippers to determine the dispatch timing
of accumulated orders, they use the fixed volume threshold (which is set at the strategic level).
For example, a shipper may dispatch all its orders when their total volume exceeds 18m3. An
exception to this rule occurs when the set of accumulated orders contains an urgent order for
which further postponement would violate its delivery window. If the set contains at least one
urgent order, the shipper dispatches all orders that can already be delivered.
Based on the transport jobs communicated by the shippers, the carriers have to solve routing
problems, namely the pickup route to collect orders at shippers and the delivery route to deliver
orders to receivers. Both routing problems are independently solved with the Clarke-Wright
savings algorithm and improved with a 2-opt heuristic.
The UCC makes two operational decisions, namely the dispatching decision and the routing
decision. To solve its dispatching decisions, the UCC uses a sampling procedure as described
in Section 3.6.2. To limit the computational effort, we apply a k-means clustering algorithm
that assigns receivers to 1 of 10 clusters that may be visited, rather than enumerating every
possible combination of receivers to visit. Like the carriers, the UCC also uses the Clarke-
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Wright algorithm in combination with 2-opt to solve their routing problems, with each tour
both starting and ending at the UCC location.
4.4 Results of the numerical experiments
The full experimental results are shown in Appendix A; this section describes the key insights.
We start with discussing the isolated effects, i.e., the effect of only a single intervention compared
to the default scheme. Table 4 summarizes the isolated effects of the individual interventions on
both the financial performance of the agents and three environmental performance indicators.
The only interventions that have a substantial environmental impact are subsidizing carriers
(leading to increased use of the UCC), forming carrier coalitions (improving the transport
efficiency), and to a lesser extent the zone access fee (leading to increased use of the UCC).
Finally, we point out that positive financial effects for one agent type typically imply negative
effects for other agent types, illustrating the challenge of finding schemes that are beneficial for
everyone. This is particularly visible when subsidizing carriers; the financial performance of the
UCC improves considerably, but this ultimately is at the expense of the carriers.
Table 4: Isolated effects per intervention. Positive percentages indicate a positive change, i.e., higher
profits/lower costs for financial indicators, and lower emissions/less vehicles for environmental
indicators.
Variable Description Financial Environmental
Carrier Receiver Shipper UCC PM # vehicles Vehicle dist.
A Access time window -8% -2% 0% 0% 0% 1% 1%
B Carrier subsidies -85% 4% 2% 25% 30% 18% 16%
C Zone access fee 22% 1% -2% 1% 7% 1% 1%
D UCC margin value-adding service 0% -2% -1% 0% -1% 0% 1%
E Carrier coalition 766% 0% 0% -2% 46% 55% 55%
F Shipper dispatch threshold 10% -1% -2% 0% 0% -2% -2%
We continue by describing the main effects (the average over all schemes with and without
the intervention) and the two-way interaction effects (the average over all schemes with and
without two given interventions). Figure 4 and Figure 5 display all statistically significant main
financial effects and -environmental effects respectively, along with their 95% confidence bounds.
The full overview of all effects (including non-significant ones) can be found in Appendix B.
First, we discuss the most important main effects. Again, we see that the carrier coalition
(Var. E) has the greatest impact by far, strongly improving the performance for carriers. The
efficiency gain reduces the usage of the UCC, leading to significantly larger losses for the UCC.
Subsidizing carriers (Var. B) strongly improves the financial performance of the UCC; also the
receivers benefit significantly. However, the carriers themselves are ultimately worse off. When
carriers commit to the UCC, receivers are more inclined to also use the UCC for value-adding
services. This lock-in effect makes it non-beneficial for carriers to unilaterally opt out, yet they
end up having higher costs. Five main effects are statistically significant for the shippers, yet
this is primarily caused by the small variance of the simulation results for this group of agents,
rather than the magnitude of the effects.
In terms of environmental impact, only three interventions have significant effects. Subsidizing
carriers has a positive effect on emissions, but negatively affects the number of vehicles and the
total vehicle distance. This can be explained by the increased use of the UCC’s vehicles that
have lower emissions, but more of them are needed to transport the same volume. This is
particularly the case in schemes including carrier coalitions (comprising half of the schemes
that determine the main effect); in those cases inbound trucks are usually loaded efficiently. A
similar effect can be observed for the zone access fee, but in this case the effect on emissions is
not significant. The carrier coalition has positive effects on all environmental indicators, due to
the increased transport efficiency.
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Figure 4: Financial main effects per agent type.
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Figure 5: Environmental main effects per agent type.
Next, we discuss the two-way interaction effects, shown in Figure 6 (financial) and Figure 7
(environmental). Most notably, 6 out of 15 interaction effects have a positive and significant
effect on the carriers. The strongest positive effect combines subsidizing with the carrier
coalition; this is likely due to the higher commitment of receivers. For the UCC itself this
interaction has a negative impact. The strongest negative effect combines the zone access
fee with the carrier coalition. In this case, the fee is insufficient to alter the behavior of the
coalition (as direct delivery almost always remains cheaper than outsourcing), so the coalition
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simply incurs the fees. Again, effects on the shipper are significant but marginal.
Interestingly, for the environmental performance there are only negative interactions that
are significant. The strongest effects are combining subsidization or a zone access fee with the
carrier coalition. This implies that more use is made of the UCC, while actually being less
efficient. Also two combinations including the access time window yield negative effects. Both
a higher price for value-adding services and a higher dispatch threshold make the UCC a less
attractive transport alternative, but direct delivery to carriers is less efficient due to the imposed
access windows.
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Figure 6: Financial interaction effects per agent type.
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Figure 7: Environmental interaction effects per agent type.
To give some additional insights into interpreting the experimental results, we briefly present
some results obtained from sensitivity analysis. We start by analyzing the isolated effects of
changing the intervention setting of individual numerical variables, keeping all other variables
at their default levels.
The threshold value at which shippers dispatch shipments has limited impact in our experiments.
As there is a relatively high chance of having at least one urgent order that must be dispatched,
we find that a threshold larger than 0.2 truckloads do not yield additional efficiency gains.
Next, we test the effect of changing the width of the access time window for trucks. Whereas
the tested window of 2 hours somewhat increases utilization of the UCC, a window of 1 hour
is considerably more effective. Windows even more narrow effectively serve as a truck ban,
forcing all carriers to use the UCC. A zone access fee of e15 (as compared to the currently used
10) is already a considerably more effective, prompting about 50% of the carriers to commit
to the UCC. However, full commitment is not ensured until setting the fee at e45 or higher.
Finally, we test the sensitivity with respect to subsidies. Although higher subsidies are more
effective in committing carriers quickly, they eventually result in disproportionally large costs
for carriers, making carriers more likely to opt out when subsidies are halted. In fact, from
an environmental perspective, a 20% yields better effects than 30%, due to the more even
commitment from carriers and receivers. However, from the UCCs perspective, higher subsidies
remain the more appealing option.
Based on the insights obtained from the factorial design and the sensitivity analysis, we also
test a number of schemes with manually selected parameters for the administrative interventions.
Particularly, we are testing the impacts of lower subsidies, narrower access windows and/or
higher zone access fees. We find that a combination of lower subsidies (20%) coupled with
an access window of 1 hour yields the best environmental results, while also improving upon
the default scheme for the financial KPIs of the agents. The reason for this improvement is
that both lower subsidies and narrower access windows affect receivers as well, resulting in
a larger commitment by paying receivers and alleviating some of the financial burden for the
carriers. This yields a more stable situation after subsidies are halted. Similar experiments were
repeated for the situation in which carriers formed a coalition, but both from a financial and an
environmental perspective the UCC does not improve upon the performance of the coalition.
We reflect on the obtained insights from a practical point of view. First, the carrier coalition
is very effective, as the consolidation of goods yields significant savings both on the line haul
and the last mile. Although theoretical savings are possible, we emphasize that implementation
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concerns – such as gain-sharing – are not addressed in these experiments. Also, we stress
that this study only addressed a single city; in reality, trucks may carry higher loads that are
destined for multiple city, implying a higher transport efficiency for individual carriers. Second,
the order in which carriers and receivers commit to the UCC has a large impact on the eventual
steady state of the system, which is particularly visible with the subsidy intervention. Clearly,
in reality a system will not be that rigid; carriers might unilaterally opt out or renegotiate
terms with the UCC. Still, the order of attracting users is very important for real-life UCCs and
administrators, as (i) carriers potentially generate the bulk of the revenue and (ii) it should be
verified whether the UCC remains a financially acceptable alternative for carriers after subsidies
are halted. Third, in line with many observations in practice, we note that none of the schemes
yields a profitable scheme for the UCC. However, we emphasize that UCCs typically handle
smaller volumes than the generic volume range for these experiments; the prices per volume
unit charged in our simulation are therefore relatively low. Fourth, the interventions generally
affect carriers and the UCC the strongest; the impact on receivers and shippers is generally
limited. We summarize the key managerial insights from our simulation study as follows:
• Increased collaboration between carriers may effectively address inefficiency in urban transport
and achieve substantial reductions in both emissions and the number of trucks in urban
areas.
• UCCs may yield considerable environmental benefits, but even with supportive administrative
measures UCCs are unlikely to achieve financial sustainability.
• Carriers are affected the most by the interventions, but also have the most direct influence
on the efficiency of the transport system. Their support for any scheme should therefore
be ensured.
We conclude with some remarks on the computational time. On average, a simulation run
with 1250 decision epochs – of which 50 are tactical epochs – took 68.4 minutes to complete.
A tactical decision epoch takes 50 times longer to solve than a operational epoch due to the
lookahead procedure. Heuristic approaches to estimate the lookahead costs could therefore
considerably reduce the reported computational time. The computational time largely depends
on the number of order types; the current experiments distinguished 240,000 order types.
5 Conclusions
This paper presents an ABS framework that enables the evaluation of a vast array of urban
logistics schemes, taking into account the autonomous decision making processes of five agent
types and their corresponding KPIs (both financial and environmental), actions, monetary
flows, and information flows. To enable other researchers to apply our framework, we precisely
mathematically define the agent actions, transition functions, and cost functions. Compared to
other ABS studies in urban freight transport, our framework distinguishes itself as follows. First,
we explicitly take into account line-haul transport and upstream decisions; other studies typically
ignore decisions made outside the city boundaries. Second, our framework explicitly focuses on
evaluating the synergy between company-driven initiatives and administrative policies, as in
practice such combinations often yield the most successful schemes. In particular, we emphasize
cooperative freight bundling, as many shipments in urban freight transport are simply too small
to efficiently utilize transport resources. Third, we define three levels of decision-making to
reflect the various impacts of decisions over time, and suggest applicable solution methods for
each level.
Numerical experiments performed with the framework indicate that initiatives based on
cooperatively bundling goods – such as a UCC or forming a coalition of carriers – yield considerable
environmental benefits. However, achieving financial sustainability for all agents involved remains
challenging. In particular, we did not identify any schemes in which the UCC is profitable in
the long run. Subsidizing carriers to use the UCC and implementing a zone-access fee appear
to be effective supportive interventions for the UCC, but are still insufficient from a financial
perspective. Finally, carriers are influenced the most by interventions and have the largest direct
effect on transport efficiency.
The experiments also demonstrate that the framework enables to evaluate large numbers
of schemes within reasonable computational time. For long-term success, it is important that
schemes are supported by the involved actors; the framework helps to identify such schemes out
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of many possible combinations of interventions and parameter settings. If a scheme yields both
good environmental results and financial performance, it may be explored in further depth. As
such, the framework is primarily useful as a tool to quantify the effects of schemes and filter out
the most promising ones.
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Appendix A
Table 5: Overview of results per scheme, relative to default scheme. (averages over 10 replications)
Scheme Variable Financial performance Environmental performance
A B C D E F Rec Car Shp UCC PM Distance # trucks
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00
1 x -1.04% -1.57% 9.96% -0.06% -0.03% -1.74% -2.04%
2 x 1.64% -0.29% 765.65% -1.59% 45.86% 55.16% 55.23%
3 x x 2.32% 1.22% 752.38% -1.55% 46.31% 54.92% 55.18%
4 x -1.68% -0.57% -0.08% -0.09% -0.58% 0.17% 0.52%
5 x x -2.24% 2.17% -2.82% 0.12% 2.89% 1.85% 1.81%
6 x x 1.87% 2.06% 704.72% -1.62% 47.93% 57.50% 57.69%
7 x x x 0.45% 0.62% 744.93% -1.43% 45.77% 54.16% 54.40%
8 x 1.22% -1.97% 21.64% 0.53% 6.89% 1.29% 0.60%
9 x x -1.90% 0.08% -9.46% 0.59% 3.49% 1.81% 1.59%
10 x x 1.61% 0.33% 569.42% -1.57% 46.42% 55.83% 55.95%
11 x x x 4.75% -0.10% 604.71% -1.73% 46.53% 56.34% 56.40%
12 x x -1.05% 0.99% 4.48% 0.99% 8.70% 4.56% 3.56%
13 x x x 1.48% -0.15% -38.30% 0.00% 1.82% 5.32% 6.46%
14 x x x -4.48% -0.97% 589.83% -1.40% 45.22% 54.34% 54.34%
15 x x x x 4.07% 0.07% 596.23% -1.42% 45.94% 54.97% 55.12%
16 x 4.39% 1.91% -85.05% 25.08% 29.56% 17.53% 16.27%
17 x x 3.18% 4.69% -92.30% 27.03% 33.49% 21.25% 20.16%
18 x x 15.70% 0.30% 708.64% 11.09% 31.10% 17.59% 16.39%
19 x x x 9.52% -1.48% 698.46% 6.11% 36.03% 31.77% 30.94%
20 x x 2.99% -2.28% -71.37% 22.76% 24.99% 12.56% 11.20%
21 x x x 6.23% -2.41% -81.06% 24.82% 24.98% 12.54% 11.43%
22 x x x 3.74% -2.55% 770.98% 3.54% 37.61% 37.31% 36.95%
23 x x x x -1.16% 1.85% 815.10% -1.16% 46.21% 53.99% 54.18%
24 x x 8.77% -0.15% -92.86% 28.33% 30.86% 17.30% 16.02%
25 x x x 6.29% 1.31% -94.11% 28.60% 32.12% 18.80% 17.54%
26 x x x 12.57% 0.33% 632.35% 12.51% 31.14% 17.63% 16.47%
27 x x x x 8.32% 1.54% 627.12% 12.93% 32.42% 19.17% 17.97%
28 x x x 4.10% 1.32% -93.85% 28.54% 32.27% 18.99% 17.64%
29 x x x x 5.76% -1.55% -91.20% 28.58% 30.00% 16.27% 14.64%
30 x x x x 14.10% -2.04% 637.26% 12.22% 29.31% 15.44% 14.11%
31 x x x x x 10.90% 1.15% 621.22% 12.86% 31.97% 18.63% 17.47%
32 x -2.32% 0.49% -8.44% 0.15% -0.05% 0.61% 1.10%
33 x x -5.02% -1.23% 2.64% 0.04% -0.40% -0.48% -0.57%
34 x x -4.13% 3.14% 705.40% -1.64% 48.44% 57.58% 57.71%
35 x x x 0.71% 2.17% 726.84% -1.74% 47.39% 56.07% 56.15%
36 x x -3.25% 1.51% -4.70% 0.06% 1.75% 1.88% 2.01%
37 x x x -1.40% 0.75% 3.42% 0.12% 0.67% 0.27% 0.38%
38 x x x -6.50% 2.33% 787.84% -0.87% 45.28% 51.76% 51.86%
39 x x x x -1.93% -0.75% 690.45% -1.66% 45.21% 54.33% 54.59%
40 x x -2.05% -1.30% 11.64% 0.75% 5.78% 1.34% 1.14%
41 x x x -1.04% -0.64% -7.96% 0.24% 1.22% 0.01% 0.06%
42 x x x -0.44% 2.01% 648.31% -1.18% 46.04% 53.40% 53.31%
43 x x x x 4.11% 1.51% 581.97% -1.52% 47.13% 56.34% 56.61%
44 x x x 0.13% -3.10% 2.64% 0.09% -0.96% -2.40% -2.71%
45 x x x x -2.12% 0.53% 11.33% 0.71% 9.21% 4.02% 2.97%
46 x x x x -0.98% 0.13% 547.49% -1.86% 46.79% 56.69% 56.76%
47 x x x x x 2.64% 0.79% 605.08% -1.57% 46.30% 55.00% 55.18%
48 x x 5.37% 1.73% -83.05% 24.37% 28.89% 17.15% 15.81%
49 x x x 5.01% 0.23% -87.42% 26.11% 28.82% 16.31% 15.17%
50 x x x 6.01% 1.20% 804.32% -1.19% 46.05% 54.29% 54.28%
51 x x x x 9.93% 1.63% 692.66% 11.78% 32.46% 19.22% 17.94%
52 x x x 4.47% 0.76% -90.03% 27.40% 30.52% 17.46% 16.20%
53 x x x x 2.59% 1.15% -91.88% 28.04% 31.65% 18.47% 17.12%
54 x x x x 7.14% -0.36% 727.60% 10.12% 32.08% 20.70% 19.70%
55 x x x x x 6.39% -4.25% 765.07% 10.65% 27.37% 13.13% 11.73%
56 x x x 6.24% 1.14% -93.80% 28.56% 31.88% 18.52% 17.48%
57 x x x x 7.70% 0.74% -93.27% 28.32% 31.67% 18.27% 16.95%
58 x x x x 8.71% 1.15% 623.98% 12.94% 32.04% 18.72% 17.41%
59 x x x x x 10.48% 1.06% 626.34% 12.85% 31.84% 18.47% 17.22%
60 x x x x 13.78% -0.09% -93.40% 28.18% 30.89% 17.34% 16.03%
61 x x x x x 9.42% -0.09% -92.46% 28.39% 30.70% 17.20% 15.99%
62 x x x x x 10.21% 0.19% 631.10% 12.80% 31.11% 17.60% 16.34%
63 x x x x x x 6.62% -3.93% 643.92% 12.42% 27.75% 13.58% 12.00%
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Table 6: Overview of main effects and two-way interaction effects.
Var Receiver Shipper Carrier UCC PM Vehicle distance # vehicles
Low Avg Hgh Low Avg Hgh Low Avg Hgh Low Avg Hgh Low Avg Hgh Low Avg Hgh Low Avg Hgh
A -1.22 -0.81 -0.40 0.20 0.21 0.22 -6.13 -0.91 4.32 -0.02 0.57 1.16 -1.15 -0.36 0.42 -2.97 -1.26 0.45 -3.03 -1.29 0.46
B 7.37 7.88 8.39 -0.20 -0.19 -0.18 -36.47 -31.82 -27.17 18.22 18.93 19.64 6.34 7.40 8.46 -9.75 -7.49 -5.23 -10.96 -8.64 -6.32
C 1.95 2.53 3.11 -0.44 -0.43 -0.43 -73.49 -66.92 -60.35 1.73 2.37 3.01 -0.76 0.19 1.15 -4.90 -2.64 -0.38 -5.26 -2.91 -0.55
D -1.44 -1.07 -0.71 -0.88 -0.87 -0.86 -4.58 2.59 9.76 -0.71 -0.15 0.41 -1.42 -0.63 0.17 -1.98 -0.46 1.05 -1.50 -0.23 1.04
E 1.65 2.21 2.78 0.16 0.18 0.19 701.27 721.20 741.13 -10.53 -9.66 -8.80 22.72 23.60 24.49 28.47 30.54 32.60 28.65 30.78 32.92
F -0.24 0.10 0.43 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -9.32 -4.41 0.50 -0.22 0.30 0.82 -0.92 -0.15 0.62 -1.70 -0.17 1.36 -1.67 -0.43 0.82
AxB 0.62 1.10 1.58 -0.20 -0.19 -0.18 -4.94 -0.32 4.30 -0.07 0.55 1.17 -0.86 -0.15 0.55 -2.29 -0.63 1.03 -2.40 -0.68 1.05
AxC 0.15 0.62 1.08 -0.23 -0.22 -0.20 1.42 5.18 8.94 -1.23 -0.60 0.03 -0.75 0.01 0.76 -1.24 0.48 2.19 -1.28 0.50 2.27
AxD 0.48 0.94 1.41 -0.35 -0.34 -0.34 -6.60 -3.01 0.58 0.45 1.04 1.63 -1.41 -0.80 -0.20 -4.17 -2.59 -1.00 -4.55 -3.01 -1.48
AxE -1.30 -0.87 -0.44 0.15 0.16 0.17 -6.81 -1.01 4.79 -0.34 0.21 0.77 -1.07 -0.41 0.24 -2.75 -1.10 0.54 -2.86 -1.16 0.54
AxF 0.19 0.63 1.08 -0.71 -0.70 -0.69 -9.03 -4.35 0.32 0.03 0.61 1.19 -1.74 -0.94 -0.15 -4.18 -2.48 -0.78 -3.92 -2.42 -0.91
BxC 0.20 0.75 1.30 0.42 0.43 0.44 -1.59 4.28 10.14 1.49 2.16 2.83 -2.72 -1.69 -0.65 -5.80 -3.57 -1.34 -5.87 -3.58 -1.29
BxD -0.75 -0.24 0.28 -1.04 -1.03 -1.02 6.65 10.85 15.05 -0.78 -0.18 0.42 -1.24 -0.68 -0.13 -2.38 -0.84 0.71 -1.87 -0.61 0.65
BxE -0.22 0.47 1.15 -0.98 -0.97 -0.95 52.45 57.12 61.80 -8.72 -7.88 -7.03 -21.03 -20.28 -19.53 -25.76 -23.58 -21.40 -25.87 -23.60 -21.32
BxF -1.95 -1.42 -0.88 -0.06 -0.05 -0.04 -4.56 0.25 5.05 -0.20 0.40 1.00 -0.50 0.10 0.70 -1.99 -0.39 1.21 -1.94 -0.73 0.48
CxD 0.61 1.03 1.44 0.00 0.01 0.02 -11.13 -7.25 -3.38 -0.55 0.05 0.64 -0.55 -0.03 0.50 -1.33 0.11 1.55 -1.31 -0.23 0.86
CxE -0.46 0.06 0.58 0.19 0.21 0.22 -69.79 -62.75 -55.71 -0.11 0.78 1.67 -3.70 -2.89 -2.09 -6.14 -4.07 -1.99 -6.24 -4.11 -1.99
CxF -0.26 0.22 0.69 0.27 0.28 0.29 -2.38 0.97 4.31 -0.91 -0.31 0.29 -0.79 -0.11 0.57 -0.95 0.65 2.25 -0.25 1.03 2.30
DxE -1.86 -1.35 -0.84 -0.48 -0.46 -0.45 -2.49 4.30 11.10 -0.68 -0.15 0.37 -0.89 -0.33 0.23 -1.80 -0.37 1.06 -1.40 -0.09 1.22
DxF -0.49 0.10 0.68 -0.09 -0.08 -0.07 1.77 7.44 13.11 -1.17 -0.38 0.41 -0.35 0.50 1.35 -1.23 0.91 3.05 -1.24 1.01 3.25
ExF 0.09 0.61 1.13 -0.24 -0.23 -0.23 -3.32 0.51 4.33 -0.60 -0.08 0.45 -0.72 -0.21 0.30 -2.01 -0.54 0.93 -2.04 -0.81 0.42
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